Indonesian Presidential Election 2019 sees a rematch between Prabowo Subianto and President Joko Widodo. The threat by intolerant Islamics elements that are deeply rooted within the political mainstream, has not only posed Indonesia’s democratic downturn. Opposition pressure at national level had also contributed to this phenomena. The Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial election has been the decisive specimen applied in the 2019 Presidential Election. The Presidential election has witnessed the repurpose of the Jakarta Gubernatorial political campaign techniques namely the sectarian mobilisation polarizing the public opinion, and the politics of the religious identity. Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno Presidential Election Grand Campaign on April 7, 2019, was very different from any other grand campaign on Indonesian election history. Adapting the qualitative methods, the researcher conducted interviews to 4 editors from trusted online media in Indonesia. Media framing and othering are important in this discussion, as it can describe how online media journalists implemented their professional work to cover and deliver the Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno presidential election grand campaign on April 7, 2019.
scaled down. Instead, a ‘soft’ or non-violent ethnic politics have been prevalent, particularly since the introduction of the direct election system for governor, regent and mayor in 2005 (Miichi, 2019). In numerous local elections, ethnic divisions have become more than obvious by condoning appreciation of *adat* (local custom) and highlighting sentiment of *putra daerah* (indigenous ethnic group; literally ‘sons of the region’) by the candidates of local government leaders. Correspondingly, exhibiting Islamic symbols is perceived as confirming one’s local identities. The local by-laws like prostitution, gambling, alcohol, reciting the Quran, offering zakat (alms or religious tax), wearing Moslem wardrobe and the conduct of women in public have been introduced in more than fifty regencies (Miichi, 2019).

The year 2014 was a historical turning point for Indonesia after the Soeharto era. This year signified the end of one decade-long President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration. He was the first Indonesian president directly elected and the first president to be democratically re-elected as well. As Indonesian democracy underwent a significant inversion, it was also the year of hardship. Two presidential candidates had a faced-off campaign in July. Representing continuity on Indonesia democratisation, the first candidate was Joko Widodo or famously known as Jokowi. While his rival, former Army Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, supported a more authoritarian-populist campaign aiming at re-centralising the power and disassembling key democratic institutions. Conclusively, Jokowi’s electoral winning margin was comfortably 6.3 percent, but this margin was much narrower than public opinion early survey predictions. That Prabowo was defeated by a mere margin, suggested Indonesian political observers a more serious speculation as Indonesia is considered as an eminent democratic country in Asia (Aspinall, 2015).

Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto rise as populist leaders as the representation of the freely defined ‘people’ against elites, as they often claim themselves as having a direct, personalistic relationship with the society. As economic hardship or intolerable corruption from formal political institutions have disenfranchised politically a large number of people, the two candidates were likely to appear. The populists label fit very well for either Jokowi or Prabowo, but they resemble more than general public unhappiness manifestation: part of their reason was the two candidates’ stark personality to that of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s. Joko Widodo’s personality, many people found, showed more popular virtuosity rather than Yudhoyono’s stern formality; on the other hand, Prabowo Subianto’s personality underscored ‘firm leadership’ as the antithesis to Yudhoyono’s indecisive leadership style. In conclusion, both Jokowi and Prabowo were distinctive populists, yet they have contradicted Yudhoyono (Aspinall, 2015).

On April 9, 2014 Indonesia held the fourth general elections after the Soeharto regime. This general election did not reveal any novel trends from the previous elections. A faint improvement was apparent from the Islamic-based political parties in the 2014 election, with only 31.4 percent vote total. It had a slight increase from 29.0 percent from the 2009 election. While on the presidential election on July 9 2014, Jokowi won the rally against Prabowo Subianto with 53.15 percent against Prabowo’s 46.85 percent. These numbers were very close to the quick counts prediction. On July 22, July 2014, Jokowi was officially announced as the election winner by the General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum [KPU]) (Aspinall, 2015).

In 2017, the requirement of securing a minimum 20 percent of seats at The House of Representatives (DPR-RI) or 25 percent of the popular votes became the new Indonesian Elections Laws for political parties applying for presidential candidate nomination. Prabowo Subianto, as the chairman of Gerakan Indonesia Raya Party (Partai Gerindra) at its national coordination meeting in Hambalang West Java on April 11 2018, secured his party’s mandate for the presidential run. The appointment of Prabowo Subianto for presidential candidate ended the speculation over whether he was refraining from election and endorsing another candidate for the 2019 presidential elections. The 2019 presidential election witnessed another rematch between Prabowo Subianto and President Joko Widodo (Aritonang, 2018).

Setbacks in Indonesia’s democratic consistencies were apparent in the 2018 political events. The examples were June’s simultaneous local government head direct elections (pilkada serentak) and August’s presidential nominations. These political events not only exhibited intolerant Islamic elements penetrating further within the Indonesia political mainstream. But the opposition weakness and active suppression at the national and sub-national levels also pointed out the democratie accountability decline (Power, 2018).

A strategic model of electoral rivalry of 2018 and 2019 was the 2017 Jakarta governor election state of affairs. Before the commencement of Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election, hundreds of thousands of conservative Moslems flocked to the Monumen Nasional (Monas) to protest the incumbent Governor of Jakarta. They disputed Basuki Tjahaja Purnama’s (Ahok), an ethnic Chinese Christian and close Jokowi partner, blasphemous comments. A powerful quasi-official Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholar (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) had also supported the charge of Ahok’s blasphemy comments. Further, a National Movement to Safeguard the MUI Fatwa (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia) was established to organize a series of mass public demonstrations to demand Ahok’s electoral disqualification, arrest, and imprisonment. Two largest public gatherings and demonstrations in 2016, which were on November 4 (dubbed ‘411’) and on
December 2 (dubbed ‘212), gave implication of the new Indonesia political force rise, that came to be popular as the ‘212 Movement’ (Power, 2018).

The public opinion configuration had been decisively altered because of this factional mobilisation during the governor direct election campaign. It shifted the spotlight from Ahok’s impressive bureaucratic and programmatic reform achievement, toward religious identity politics. The second round election was won by Anies Rasyid Baswedan, an Arab ethnic, an academic and Joko Widodo’s first education minister, and his tandem Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno as the young and energetic business tycoon. Both candidates were endorsed by Prabowo Subianto from Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerindra) and the Moslem Brotherhood-linked Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera). The coalition increased the polls after activelystraighten their campaigns with the Islamist movements and its leader. Their Islamist allies organized an extremely effective public campaigns, focusing the mosques, religious study groups, and social media. They sustained Ahok’s the personality as an enemy of Islam and emphasized Moslem’s attention on the sinfulness of electing for a non-Moslem leader. These campaigns happened particularly in the lead-up to the second round of election voting (Power, 2018).

Reflecting from Jakarta’s gubernatorial election experience, the political leaders of opposition and government reckoned the anti-Ahok campaign as a tactical mode that could be reused in 2018 local elections, and even for 2019 presidential race against President Joko Widodo. With 74 percent performance rating as governor, Ahok popularity and well-performance had been subdued by sectarian campaigns exhibiting highly polarised, well-organised, and resourceful parties (Mietzner and Muhtadi in Power, 2018). Opposition forces are keen in maintaining the political gap in Jakarta, furthermore they construct a strong narrative that Joko Widodo’s coalition administration acts antagonistically towards the Moslems. After the victory of Anies-Sandiaga, Prabowo Subianto said gratitude to the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam) publicly, because they have supported Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno pair. And the following months, PKS President Sohibul Imam as one of the opposition leaders, stated firmly the need to transmit the ‘spirit of Jakarta victory’ to other regions and the upcoming presidential race (Power, 2018).

At the beginning of the presidential election campaign, Prabowo Subianto and his executive partner Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno have announced Indonesia Adil Makmur (Fair and Prosperous Indonesia) as their 2019 presidential political platform. Explaining their program for the next five years, the platform consists of 15 pages of a so-called blue book. The grand vision is “to create an Indonesia that is fair, prosperous, dignified, politically sovereign, economically independent and with strong national characteristics, as well as to guarantee harmony among citizens regardless of ethnicity, religion, social and racial background based on Pancasila and the Constitution” (Heriyanto, 2018).

But the realities were different from a grand vision. The Islamic rallies in several Indonesian cities at the beginning of presidential campaign showed that the prospect of religious campaigning and sectarian mobilisation is still lurking. These rallies, dubbed ‘Defending the Tauhid Action’ were organised by the National Movement to Safeguard the MUI Fatwa (Gerakan Nasional PENGAWAL FATWA Majelis Ulama Indonesia). The incident in October 2018 which became the trigger, where members of the youth wing of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation and a supporter of Jokowi, burnt a flag bearing the Islamic declaration of faith. During the rallies to protest the flag’s burning, there were calls of ‘ganti presiden’ (change the president) as some protesters attempted to connect the rallies to the election campaign. Both presidential candidates take the prospect of identity politics featuring the campaign very seriously. Jokowi has appointed Ma’ruf Amin as his vice-presidential candidate, who is well-known as the conservative and senior Islamic scholar. And in mid-September 2018 Prabowo Subianto signed a pact with conservative Islamic scholars and Muslim activist at a congregation of GNPF, the organiser of the rallies (Simandjuntak, 2018).

The abolishment of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, a pan-Islamist political organization that support the establishment of a under one global caliphate as Joko Widodo government’s resolution, is one of the strategies used by Prabowo Subianto to attack Joko Widodo. By manipulating religious sentiment, The religious sentiment does not guarantee Joko Widodo, as a Moslem himself, to be exploited against him, too. An accusation of becoming anti-Islam governor indicated by a subpoena against Rizieq Shihab, an imam (leader) from the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam), released two years before, in which the police alleged of sexting conduct and violating anti-pornography laws (Kurniawan, 2019).

As a son of a Christian mother and Soeharto’s, a former Indonesian dictator, son-in-law Prabowo Subianto has transformed himself into a crusading populist and obedient Moslem during the election cycle as a last-ditch effort to impress nationalists, Islamicahard-liners and large number of poor Indonesian population. To be the presidential race winner would be a Prabowo’s personal triumph and perfected his own personal image. Since Suharto dethroned in May 1998, Prabowo has run for each presidential election (Paddock, 2019).

Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno presidential election grand campaign on April 7, 2019, is very different from any other grand campaign on Indonesian election history. Thousands of Prabowo-Sandiaga supporters gathered in Gelora
Bung Karno Stadium in Central Jakarta, Capital City of Indonesia, doing morning prayer (shalat subuh berjamaah). They stay until Rizieq Shihab speech via video call. On this paper I will discuss about how Indonesian online media mainstream journalists cover this particular event, and delivered the news to the public. What factors influenced them to cover and write about this particular political agenda? Is there any agenda setting or media framing they implemented on this issue?

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Framing

According to a study done by Entman (1993), framing is mentioned as “a scattered conceptualization” in which lack of clear conceptual definition and context-specific inclination rather than common applicable operationalization. Framing is not a well-defined and commonly applicable concept, but it is a mere metaphor that cannot be directly translated into research questions (Brosius and Eps 1995). McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver (1997) implied that framing is actually an extension of agenda setting, rather than it is only a relation between agenda setting and framing effects. They refer to the term as second-level agenda-setting reflecting the salience impact of media coverage characteristics on interpretation of the audiences of these news stories. Probably because of the inconsistencies of terminological and conceptual results, other studies have suggested agenda setting, priming, and framing without any differentiation (Scheufele, 1999). However, Entman (1993) explained in details of how the media provide the audiences with schemas for interpreting events. The substantial factors are selection and salience. Furthermore, Entman states that framing is the act of selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and generating them weightier in a communicating text. These are done delicately to campaign a particular definition of problem, interpretation of causality, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation. How news audiences comprehend has been affected by the systematic framing and presentation of events (Scheufele, 1999).

Journalism professor Maxwell McCombs’ framing definition suggests a more specific term: “Framing is the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is discussed” (Griffin et al., 2015). Nonetheless, as an interpretive construct in media studies, framing prominence resulted in diverse and ambiguous meanings. Framing is not an option. Reporters inevitably frame a story with the personal attributes of public figures they select to describe. McCombs and Shaw clearly previewed the meaning of agendas of attributes and framing: “Agenda setting as a concept is not limited to the correspondence between salience of topics for the media and the audience. We can also consider the salience of various attributes of these objects (topics, issues, persons or whatever) reported in the media. To what extent is our view of an object shaped or influenced by the picture sketched in the media, especially by those attributes which the media deem newsworthy (Griffin et al., 2015). Gitlin (1980) argues that frames are a means of presentation whereby certain elements of the communicated text are emphasized or excluded by the communicator. These definitions suggest that framing operates by making some aspect of a problem or communication more accessible, visible, or salient to an audience (Cacciatore et al., 2016).

According to Price et al. (1997), a framing effect of constructing a specific thought, which consists of significant attributes of a message (the organization, content selection, or thematic structure) resulted in their activation and use in evaluations. The act of reading news, as the conceptualization, would decide which previously stored knowledge structure (or schema) becomes active. Successively, the news articles interpreted by this activated knowledge structure. In this respect, journalists and editors’ decisions play a vital role in choosing the cognitive schema that a reader would be exercised to a news story (Cacciatore et al., 2016).

Framing is a process that describes an integrated process model of framing covering the production, content, and media use perspectives de Vreese (2005). One group of studies of generic frames particularly on the election campaign such as Capella and Jamieson (1997) who investigated the strategic news framing consequences on political cynicism. Strategic news refers to news characteristics that (1) aims at winning and losing, (2) implies the language of war, games, and competition, (3) exhibits ‘performers, critics and audiences’, (4) scrutinizes on candidate style and perceptions, and (5) leans over to polls and candidate standings. (Jamieson, 1992).

Scheufele and Tewksbury define framing construction on both macro level and a micro level (Scheufele, 1999). At a macro level, framing implies journalists and other communicators modes of presentation to exploit the information in a way that corresponds to the audience’s shared underlying schemas (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). However, this does imply that the majority of journalists spin or manipulate a story to deceive their audiences. Framing is, in fact, a necessary tool to reduce an issue’s complexity, given the limitation of news holes and airtime from their respective media (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).

Othering

The term othering is said to have been first used by Spivak for the process by which imperial discourse creates its “others”. If this definition is applied, then, a logical ideal would be to reject all othering because the imperial discourse in a hierarchical way (corresponding to Orientalists practices) reduces the Other’s position. Othering defined as the process by which an ‘I’ or a ‘we’ represents other persons. This is a dialectical approach because, by defining the Other, the subject also (re)produces
herself. Othering has always been there, manifest-
ed by individuals or groups struggling to establish their identity in relation to others. Spontaneous othering is not the task of journalists: Their role has traditionally been to analyse and digest what they observe and encounter. Although journalistic professionalism in everyday language is often described as trusting one’s ‘gut feeling’, the role of the journalist should not be seen as a mere messenger or mirror-of-society, but as professional whose responsibility and ability it is to reflect on events and statements beyond the spontaneous reactions that may occur among his or her audience (Eide, 2011). Because spontaneous othering seems to be important (first) way of relating to the Other, it needs to be examined in depth as part of the critical self-reflection in journalism. Journalists enter and leave their professional role, they are human beings as well, and a large part of the othering stems from their experiences in their non-journalistic life. As a human being, I am living in and experiencing society in a variety of ways (Eide, 2011).

Othering, as Spivak described, is a multidimen-
sional process, in the context that it comprises several different forms of social differentiation. Further, as a concept othering can therefore be combined with previously conceptualised as intersectionality. According to Spivak (1985), the process of othering has the characteristics as class, race, and gender. Jensen (2011) explains othering as powerful groups, either as numerical majority or not, discursive processes that outlines reductionism to existence of subordinate groups possessing problematic and/or inferior characteristics. The discursive process has asserted the dominant superiority and legitimacy, and also constructed subordinate group identity formation.

Both media framing and othering are important in this discussion, as it can describe how Indonesian online media journalists implemented their professional work to cover and deliver the event of Prabowo Subianto–Sandiaga Uno presidential election grand campaign on April 7, 2019.

**METHODOLOGY**

In order to gain a better insight, how Indonesian online media journalists cover the story on Prabowo Subianto–Sandiaga Uno presidential election grand campaign on April 7, 2019, qualitative methods used in this research, describing and gaining in-depth insight about media framing, agenda setting on political news stories, particularly on presidential race campaign. Interviews to 4 editors from trusted online media in Indonesia were conducted last week of April 2019. They are from kompas.com, detik.com, merdeka.com and mediaindonesia.com. The editors are senior journalists in their office, with experiences on political news coverage. The interviews were 20 to 30 minutes long respectively. Note-taking technique has documented the answers. Although unstructured interviews generate results that cannot be gen-
alized beyond the sample group only, they offer a more in-depth understanding of perception, motivations and emotions from the participants.

**DISCUSSION**

The duo presidential candidate, Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno, organized their largest open rally or campaign at Gelora Bung Karno Stadium, Central Jakarta on Sunday, April 7, 2019. However, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as a senior politician and former president, criticized the event calling it “too exclusive” because it was dominated by Islamic activities. The political campaign stage at Gelora Bung Karno Stadium was transformed into a large site for mass prayers. Tens of thousands of people shouted Alla-

**News Reports on Merdeka.com**

I asked at least six main questions to Ramadhian Fadillah, Deputy Editor in Chief merdeka.com. First, what kind of social realities they want to tell the audiences about the Prabowo-Sandiaga open rally in GBK. Second, why they chosen the headline; “Grand Open Rally Prabowo Closed by 10 Messages of Habib Rizieq” (see figure 1). Third, what particular problem they identified on the grand open rally. Fourth, did they tell the audiences about particular problem found on the events. Fifth, what kind of moral evaluation they want the audiences know from the news. Sixth, was there any recommendation that written at the article about the event.
Answered the questions, Ramadhian said that this was the last article on that day (figure 1), that closed the open rally of Prabowo-Sandi campaign. The rally started early in the morning, with morning prayer and any other Islamic activities. The editors, Ramadhian said, of course filtered the messages of Rizieq Shihab. In order to be neutral, they choose the neutral headline. Because on any other online media, the messages of Rizieq Shihab are divided into numbers of articles. They thought messages of Rizieq Shihab that showed by video at Gelora Bung Karno Stadium to thousands of supporters, was very interesting, because it was the closing agenda of the rally. It means that the video was the “punch line” of Prabowo-Sandiaga. Without any particular agenda setting and media framing, what happened in Gelora Bung Karno clearly show that Prabowo and Sandiaga tried to get the sympathy of Muslim supporters and voters.

According to Ramadhian as Deputy Editor in Chief merdeka.com that interviewed on May 30, 2019, there were so many aspects of the rally that could be written as an article. But merdeka.com filtered the statements that come from the video call of Rizieq Shihab. As an example, Shihab said that Moslems should not vote communist leader. If they wrote articles about that, it would become viral soon, and opened the possibility if someone screen-shot the headline or article in order to spread hoax.

“To avoid raw interpretations, we avoid writing every word from the stage,” he said. “Without media framing, by showing the photograph of what happened in Gelora Bung Karno Stadium, Prabowo Subianto showed the Moslem public figures around him, including Yusuf Martak and Rizieq Shihab. It was their strategies to attract Moslem’s voters, and also sympathizer of 212 and 411 movement.” Moreover, at the stage, Prabowo said to the people, if he won, he will pick up Rizieq Shihab from Mecca, Saudi Arabia. At this point, Prabowo tried to build personal relation to the Moslem voters.

Ramadhian also said that the grand rally of Prabowo was different from Jokowi. Joko Widodo used musical concert with live music on the grand rally, to emphasized that they are open to all supporters and voters of all group, ethnicity and religion. But Prabowo implemented the strategy to gather sympathy only from Muslim voters, that experienced the demonstrations against the Governor Ahok at 4 November and 2 December 2016. According to Ramadhian, they seemed not important any more to write about why Prabowo and the team choose the way of grand rally, there was no moral evaluation to be written to the audiences, because the article is only running news.

As McCombs defines framing as an act of selecting a controlled number of attributes for inclusion which are thematically related with the media agenda in which a particular object is discussed. The merdeka.com selected what aspect they wanted to write on their website. Merdeka.com framed the story of Prabowo-Sandi Grand Rally with the personal attributes of Islamic public figures it selected to describe, such as Yusuf Martak, Rizieq Shihab, and even Prabowo himself. How Prabowo tried to build a good relationship with Moslem Leaders to attract voters.

On the othering concept from Jensen, from the article mentioned above, merdeka.com showing that thousands of people attending Prabowo-Sandi grand rally including the leaders, manifested they are majority in numerical aspect. They wanted to amplify that they are powerful and superior compared to Joko Widodo voters. The politics of identity, as the clothes Sandiaga Uno wear, that are similar to thousands of people there, showed very obvious that whoever is different from them, should be defeated or subordinate.

News Reports on Kompas.com

I interviewed Diamanty Meiliana, editor of kompas.com, one of the top three online media mainstream in Indonesia, that edited the article (see figure 3). The same 6 main questions which asked to Deputy Editor in Chief of merdeka.com, asked to Diamanty or Dea. She answered, there was a great campaign event for the number 02 presidential candidate, Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno at Gelora Bung Karno Stadium. The event began from dawn an was attended by thousands of supporters. There were interactions between Prabowo and his supporters. Prabowo yelled at some of the supporters, and others supporters gave small amount of money for Prabowo. Dea choose the headline or title because this article is a wrap up from the previous articles. The main goal is the readers can
get a summary of the grand rally, and by clicking the news links, the reader can find the wrap up article. Dea also said that Prabowo has so many supporters who are solid attend to be homogenous. The supporters and voters also militant, because they stay since 3 a.m., and willing to spend money to be there. “One thing that I want the readers of kompas.com to know at that time was, Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno have so many supporters, majority unified from elements of Moslem mass organisations and homogenous,” Dea said.

As Scheufele and Tewksbury refers to the act of framing as the presentation modes of journalists with existing underlying public schemas, on this quite long article, kompas.com tries to show particular aspects on Prabowo-Sandi Grand Rally, from the audience until the speakers and activities.

News Reports on Detik.com

Executive Deputy Editor detik.com Ahmad Toriq said that by the article (figure 4), they want to show that these clerics or ulama are partisan. Their movements are not as pure as their image in front of Prabowo supporters. The phrase before the comma (,) aims to show that Rizieq Shihab still forbidden to be back to Indonesia. The phrase after the comma (,) at the headline/ title of the article shows the same points as above, that Rizieq Shihab, who was ordained as high rank priest/ ulama by particular group, is partisan. Rizieq Shihab is not religious leader. By this article, editor wanted the readers to know about politics of identity that commanded by fake religious “leader”. Ahmad Toriq also said that they want the readers to know that there is politics of identity. “The readers have to be aware of it. They are expected not to be easily provoked by political propaganda or campaign in the name of religion,” Toriq said.

By detailing 10 points from Rizieq Shihab video, detik.com wanted its readers to know the personal attributes of public figures they select to describe in this article, just like what McCombs and Shaw clearly mentioned. Framing is not an option. Reporters inevitably frame a story with the personal attributes of public figures they select to describe. At this point, the public figure is Rizieq Shihab.
Even farther, as Professor Elizabeth Eide mentioned as the spontaneous othering seems to be important (first) way of relating to the Other, it needs to be examined in depth as part of the critical self-reflection in journalism. Detik.com on this article seems to reflect the diversity of Indonesia should had been showed at the grand rally of Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno. Not the opposite, only elements of Islam mass organisations showed off at the main stage with their attributes.

**News Reports on Mediaindonesia.com**

Akhmad Mustain, Executive Deputy Editor of mediaindonesia.com said that by the article (figure 5), they want to let the readers know and aware, that the politics of identity still exist, held by particular politicians and believed by many supporters and voters. This opportunity utilized by Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno. The success story of Jakarta Governor Election in 2017 triggered Prabowo and Sandiaga to use the same strategy, aiming only the Moslem voters, not only in capital city, but also for the rest of Indonesia. From the beginning of presidential election stages, Prabowo rally held Moslem movement and agendas. The grand rally or campaign at Gelora Bung Karno April 7, 2019 is the punch line. Choosing the headline or title of the article; “Kampanye di GBK Tak Kerek Suara Prabowo,” editors want to show to the readers, that even though thousands of people attending the grand rally at Gelora Bung Karno, it had no effect for electoral vote. Because the grand campaign is very exclusive only for Moslem voters. Mustain said; “Our message to the readers: politics of religious identity is not good for pluralism in Indonesia, people will be polarized, and it is not corresponding with the Constitution”. On this article, the editor wants the readers to know that during 2019 presidential election, religious movements transformed into political movements. Before 2019 General Elections, there were no such political “religious” rallies. They want the audience to differentiate between political agendas and religious agendas. Politics should not be inclusive only to one religion. “On Gelora Bung Karno rally, showed that religious movement transformed to the concrete political movement, so real than before, such as DKI Jakarta Governor Election, when ‘212 reunion’ was not frankly declared as political movement,” Mustain said.

As for me, editors of mediaindonesia.com did a very clear framing on this event, the Prabowo-Sandiaga grand rally at GBK. Similar to Entman’s (1993) framing definition stating that it is an act of picking some aspects of a perceived reality and producing more salient relations in a communicating text. This aims to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, or treatment recommendation. By a clear headline, the editor’s stand point is very clear, that pluralism has to be supported by all voters.

By quoting interviews of Director of Lembaga Survei Politik Indonesia Budiyana on the article, mediaindonesia.com stand point for othering was also very clear. That the religious movement transformed into a real political movement, because the same supporters confirmed, from the ‘411’, or ‘212 movement’, the demonstrations against Ahok, to the grand rally of Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno.

**CONCLUSION**

Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno presidential grand rally April 7, 2019 is a new phenomenon in Indonesian domestic politics. Using politics of identity, Prabowo and Sandi wanted to get more supporters and voters, because they want to repeat the success story of Jakarta Governor Election on 2017. That story shows the success of “othering” of non-moslem citizens of Jakarta, Capital City of Indonesia. Before the Jakarta governor election, there were a number of public demonstrations allegedly accusing the incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) of blasphemous comments. To worsen this, Ahok is also a Chinese Christian ethnic. These factors in fact influenced 4 editors of Indonesian online mainstream media, facing the grand rally of Prabowo and Sandi at Gelora Bung Karno. The “religious” political agenda at GBK Stadium, then becoming running news, and they put all the facts to the readers, in order to strengthen readers’ awareness for the politics of identity that can harm harmony in Indonesia. Advanced researches needed to explain this phenomenon, not only for online media, but also for newspapers, news stories of radio and television.


