The Politics of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Post-Reformation 1998

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Abstract
After the reformation (reformasi) in 1998, some civil society organizations (CSOs) have endorsed policy changes from outside the government and have involved in many ministries’ assistance team to implement government’s development programs. These CSOs’ political action changes from outside to become inside the government are caused by the openness of political opportunity from political regime after Reformasi. Even though CSOs have used these political opportunities, these organizations faced seriously challenges in political field such as the fragmented of CSOs to endorse many policy reform and changes. In addition, there is lack of supporting changes in political culture structures which are still continuing patronage relations legacies among political actors. This study strengthens Aspinall (2013a) and Mietzner (2013) arguments about how the CSOs take political opportunity after Reformasi and their challenges and response in order to adapt in Soeharto’s political legacy in two political arenas: the policy making process and electoral politics.

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Moreover, Indonesian CSOs are fragmented and weakened for endorsing some progressive issues in law making process in the House and their weakness to gain electoral support for winning the CSOs candidates in election. To gather relevant data about CSOs political activities in these arenas, this study applies process tracing method. The study’s findings confirm that even though there is more openness on political opportunity to participate in political arena, however, it seems that there are no supporting changes in political structures which are patronage relations among political actors. Therefore, Indonesian CSOs are fragmented and weakened for endorsing some progressive issues in law making process in the House and their weakness to gain electoral support for winning the CSOs candidates in election.

Keywords: civil society organizations, democracy, political party

INTRODUCTION

Indonesian Civil society organizations (CSOs) have significant roles in order to drive the direction of democratization in 1998. Various CSOs, such as non-government organizations (NGOs), student groups, and labour unions, protested to Soeharto’s regime at that time. These groups also pushed Soeharto to step down from his presidency. Since Reformasi (reformasi) in 1998, some of these CSOs have been endorsing any policy changes agenda such as making new and progressive bills from outside of the state and involving in any assistance team for implementing development programs in many ministries. These political changes that are driven by CSO side and their engagement with the state are caused by many open and accommodative political opportunities from new post Reformasi political regimes. Unfortunately, they receive any seriously challenges in any political fields such as the fragmentation of CSOs in order to drive and reform policies even though these CSOs have successfully exercised this opportunity. Meanwhile, the relation between CSOs and political parties in parliament or even in the executive institutions has been developed in term of non-formal and personal based relations among the actors in each organization.

The main argument on this paper is various political activities of Indonesian CSOs are caused by the openness of political opportunities. Although this political opportunity has been practically and widely adopted by CSOs, the changes of political institutional structures and dominant of patrimonial relation legacies cause some challenges for CSOs to develop theirs organizational solidity for responding political
changes. This study aims to explain why CSOs do some political actions after New Order regime which is caused by any institutional political structure changes and some continuity of legacies from previous regime. Therefore, this study contributes to explanation of CSOs political activities in new democracies such as Indonesia.

Some study of democratization assessment on Indonesia state that patrimonial politics tradition (Aspinall 2010), disconnected between represented persons and their constituency in national legislative chamber (Hamid 2012), and disability of the state to ensure the rule of the law (Bünite & Ufen 2009) are major problems in democratic consolidation. In particular, on the perspective of civil society actors, the country has deficit democracy and its political parties do not represent and respond to their voters. These actors also believe that political elites have monopolized political power and created an oligarchy system (Törnquist 2006:244-50). On that context, the role of CSOs in political fields in post-New Order is influenced by structural, new political institutions changes and also previous regime legacies. Therefore, these CSOs actors have challenged many uneasy problems for endorsing political changes.

According to DEMOS’ studies (Pradjasto et al. 2007), civil society actors understand that formal politics process has marginalized them since the fall of Soeharto regime in 1998. Hadiz (2013:220) states that the absence of cohesive of civil society movements to challenge the existence of oligarchy groups in the early period of Reformasi is one cause of that marginalization. These oligarch could adapt themselves to new environment which is democratic regime. On this issue, Aspinall (2013b:237) agreed with Hadiz’s argument. However, he emphasizes that there is an increased of political awareness from grass root community because some populist and progressive policies (such as free of health and education) are coming from populist governor and mayors. In this context, some of civil society actors choose to work in economy and social empowerment rather than political empowerment. Moreover, the involvement of CSOs in political field after Reformasi is consisting of active participation in law-making process, local and national issues advocacy, electoral competition, and others (Hubiani 2009; Blair 2004; Subianto 2009; Antlöv, Ibrahim, & van Tuijl 2006). Another example, CSOs attempt to disagree for any purposes and initiatives which were came from anti-reform politician groups in parliament, especially cooptation electoral body management and systematic offensive in legal authority and independency of KPK (Commission of Eradication of
Corruption) (Mietzner 2012:218-9). Meanwhile, some civil society actors who transform themselves from activists to politicians believe that this is the perfect time to actively involve in the decision making process (Ichwanuddin et al. 2010).

Although there is some cooperation between CSOs, political parties, and government in various economy and social issues, some activities in formal political fields in previous paragraph have showed that these CSOs actors encountered difficulties for using the openness of political opportunities and their limited political access with political parties in election candidacies. One explanation is a strong oligarchy groups in political parties and the lack of bargaining position from CSOs actors to develop an advantage relation with political parties.

Previous studies describe on how Indonesian CSOs contribute to democratization after Reformasi 1998. However, there is lack of study for explaining some formal political activities from CSOs actors which develop connection with parties, parliament or even with government. This paper aims to answer the main research question that why Indonesia CSOs do their political interactions with political parties (including parliament) and government after Reformation 1998. To answer this, this study explains two political activities which involve these actors: law-making process and active participation as election candidates.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses qualitative methods with case study approach to investigate contemporary phenomena in real context and to show how various parts of a case can connect to each other part (Yin 2003; Gerring 2008). A single case study can also be defined as various and deepening study on a case (Yin 2003:45-8) or a case study with synchronic and diachronic variations¹ (Gerring 2007:28). The study describes CSOs phenomena which have been doing political activities after Reformasi 1998 and considering some relations with different political actors during 1998 until today. This paper considers single case study with synchronic and diachronic variations.

For gathering related data on CSOs political activities in law-making process and political participation in election, the study uses process tracing method (Blatter dan Haverland 2012). This method traces vari-

¹This observation could construct in two different ways: dyachronic (all the time observation) or synchronic (one moment in particular time observation).
ous activities which have been done by actors in the past and connected with relevant phenomena recently. Pattern and activities in politics could read from any recorded events which are shown by news in media or previous study literatures and any clarification on in-depth interviews to these CSOs actors.

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICS IN INDONESIA

There are three points that can be explained about CSOs politics in Indonesia. The first is the concepts of civil society in Indonesia. Latter, how CSOs can apply these political opportunities in order to act for political changes. The last point discusses about institutional challenges and legacy from previous political regime which become hard barriers for CSOs to drive those changes.

There are two Indonesian civil society perspectives which both views have developed in the early 1990s (Ibrahim 2007:20-1). This first vertical perspective emphasizes how civil society groups have autonomy position to the state. Some NGOs, as part of CSOs and have opposed to the state, supported this view because it was necessary to have independency position in democratic regime at that time. Meanwhile, the second perspective, horizontal, focuses on the relational aspects between individuals and groups in civilized society. This approach was also known as “masyarakat madani” (civil society) which was introduced by Nurchohulis Madjid (Indonesian scholar) on his Islamic society reference in the Muhammad Prophet era. This approach seeks the important pluralism and tolerant principles in society. However, this concept considers as the soft approach while the role of the state in democratic regime is to facilitate the function of democracy. Therefore, this horizontal approach emphasizes the cooperative framework between state and civil society.

In this context, both perspectives should be considered to define civil society post-Soeharto era:

“The society is not merely considered as the ground or space that [is] filled with voluntary, organized and government-independent society groups, but they are also characterized by their tolerance, respect towards each other and the pluralism within them” (Ibrahim 2007:21).

Therefore, civil society in Indonesia combines two approaches which focusing on voluntary and independence aspects to the state and also con-
sider pluralism and tolerant aspects in society. Some studies have identified Indonesian civil society categorization (see for examples Ibrahim 2007; Suharko 2011). Suharko (2011:472-6) classifies Indonesian civil society based on membership and non-membership. Membership CSOs are mass organizations which based on religions, business, youth and students, and/or functional groups such as labour unions and farmers associations. Meanwhile, non-membership CSOs does not have membership that includes NGOs, voluntary organizations, half-structured of the state organizations which provide development programs. On the other hand, semi-business organizations provide community services. Ibrahim (2007:26) identifies five groups of CSOs which are influencing in political fields after post-Soeharto era: social religious organizations, labour unions, women’s movement groups, environmental groups, and advocacy NGOs groups. Indonesian civil society could also categorize with variant of membership and non-memberships based and CSOs that influence political fields. This study adopts Suharko and Ibrahim categorizations in order to seek Indonesian CSOs after Reformasi.

On comparative contexts in several new democracies, political scientists emphasize how the role of CSOs in democracy (Uhlin 2009:271; Fioramonti and Fiori 2010:26-7; White 2004:13-6): first, CSOs create formal relations for connecting various interests in society and also for facilitating political communication between citizens and the state; second, CSOs could challenge and balance of the state power whether the effort of the state for increasing its accountability to public is raising; third, as part of important indication in democratic assessment, CSOs members should endorse political participation; fourth, the strength of civil society should act as defender of public interests if there is any connection with the state, which is indicated from the enforcement of public morality and criticism to politicians and public officers; and the last point is civil society should act as external factors in deepening democracy (Merkel, 2004: 36) which are protecting democracy from any external and internal distractions and destabilized politics. Therefore, if CSOs strengthen these roles, they ensure for any significant political changes in each country.

How is CSOs formed and what roles that have been done? On the Soeharto regime, Aspinall (2004:71-4) describes three forms of CSOs. The first one is corporatist organization which developed in the early of Soeharto era (1970s) and associated with the ruling party (Golkar). For example, some labour unions were difficult to separate with Golkar.
at that time. However, in 1991, some advocacy NGOs in labour issues showed there were independent labour unions from the state (Ford, 2003). The second form is semi-corporatist organizations which have independent voices but could compromised with the state for survivals. Among these semi-corporatist groups, there are two large Islamic organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The third form is “proto-oppositional” CSOs which maintained their independences from any state intervention and had critical position to government policies. Advocacy NGOs are part of this group. Aspinall (2004:86-7) observation in the early of Reformasi finds that major of CSOs did not develop a grand design for social and political change purposes. These CSOs preferred to change some non-democratic policies. Some mass organizations that have strong attachment with society such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, supported to any creation of political parties. Although the Soeharto government successfully dominated CSOs groups, according to Aspinall’s arguments that in the early of Reformasi, these groups were increasingly their independency to the state when they applied political opportunities in new regime.

CSOs explore the opportunities because the political opportunity is more widely open for mobilizing political change. The structured of political opportunity is a configuration from various aspects such as resources, institutional arrangement, historical legacies for mobilizing social which all these aspects facilitate to the development of social protests (Kitschelt1986:58). On this political opportunity discussion, the main issue is how social movement organizations can mobilize a social change or even just only support particular candidates in election (Meyer, 2004: 138).

Dough Mc Adam (1996:27-8) states four dimensions on political opportunity. The first dimension is a relative openness or closeness of institutional political system. This dimension explains how formal political structure can easily access to any group in society. The second dimension connects with political elite stability. This dimension focuses on how political elites, particularly from political parties, receive political and organizational supports and electoral vote supports. Another dimension seeks the availability of political elite engagement. The dimension wants to see for any alliance or any coalition among political elite to decide policy-making. The last dimension discusses on how state capacities to respond any opportunities among elite politics. This dimension also emphasizes how strong the state power (in this context
repressive action) to respond any social changes which are demanded by social movements. These four dimensions would explain Indonesian CSOs for taking any political action to mobilize supports for social and political changes.

Meanwhile, Aspinall (2013a) identifies that new democracies like Indonesia has legacy problems that still continue in this post-Reformasi era. His main point is the strong patronage and clientalism in Indonesian society. The essence of patronage and clientalism is distribution of material resources from wealthy individuals or groups to any poor individuals or groups and do not have capability to gain any political aims and particular political benefits. Beside patronage, the fragmentation of civil society groups and political parties which are distributed to patron-client networking in certain regions is another related issue. Based on wide of working areas and variety of empowerment and close personal relations across organizations, Indonesian CSOs are living in complexity of political structure. On one side, CSOs have roles and responsibilities to address changes. However, in another side, CSOs are trapped into political system and structure which are continuing any previous legacies.

To seek CSOs interactions with other political actors in political structures, this study traces for any CSOs political activities after Reformasi 1998 in two arenas: the first one is CSOs activities in parliament which these CSOs actors influence law-making process, monitoring and also provide any assistance for members of the House of Representative; the second activity is CSOs actors participate in election to involve in as candidates or even just only success team from anybody of candidates. Therefore, this study strengthen Aspinall’s argument (2013a) and Mietzner (2013) for applying political opportunities in post-Reformasi and their challenges and responses on political legacies structures from previous Soeharto regime in two political fields: decision making and electoral politics.

**THE POLITICS OF CSOS IN PARLIAMENT**

Naturally, CSOs have several limitations on doing political activities in parliament which are monitoring, providing some comments, and also give some inputs on legislation products. Therefore, this section will explains on what reasons CSOs have their interactions with parliament after Reformasi in certain issues such as the amendment of Basic
Constitution (UUD 1945), security policies reform, anti-pornography issue and women’s representation. There are three things that could be explained from that activities: the first is how these CSOs use the openness of political opportunities after Reformasi in order to endorse various policies; the second is how political elites and political parties respond any CSOs issues; the last point is what is the main challenges that will be faced by these CSOs to endorse policies changes in parliament.

The active of CSOs, especially NGOs, for controlling parliament performance has detected in the transition of government BJ Habibie in 1998 to 1999. At that time, some CSOs leaders involved in as the member of the team of political bills and also the formation of electoral management. Not only on crucial issues such as election, Habibie government also responded to all demands from human right advocacy groups to punish some military officers who did verdict in political riots in May 1998. On this human right issue, some CSOs leaders also involved in several advocacy or investigation teams that were formed by the state.

On the process of Amendment of Basic Constitution from 1999 to 2003, some of NGOs which worked on law reform and good governance issues, actively involved to monitor and also to support substantial inputs and comments to parliament. These NGOs coalition, which was led by CETRO (Centre for Electoral Reform), massively campaigned in various mass medias and made some lobbying politics to resistant members of the House, particularly they proposed PDI-P and military fractions on direct presidential election issue. Moreover, the resistant groups also opposed on the reform of representation politics which debated on new regional chamber in legislative institution that called the House of Regional Representative (DPD). Based on different perspectives in the parliament, NGOs coalition realized that there was a need for making political strategies to effectively communicate with members of the House for driving certain policy.

On security reform issues in 2000-2001, according to Mietzner (2013), NGOs coalition, which was led by Rizal Sukma (Propatria), also successfully advocated military and national security reform because of some reformist politician figures such as Effendi Choirie (PKB) and Djoko Susilo (PAN). They worked and engaged with this coalition to draft substantial inputs on some security bills. Additionally, Minister of Defence Mahfud MD (PKB) had had good responses for any NGOs demands and reduced some military general wishes to reject some NGOs
proposal in his ministry. According to Mietzner, intensively communication between NGOs group, members of the House, and government officers are the main points of success story for policy reforms on that sector. Some figures, who mentioned above, have social and historical attachments with some major mass organizations in Indonesia such as Djoko Susilo and Rizal Sukma (affiliated with Muhammadiyah) and Effendi Choirie and Mahfud MD (affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama).

On anti-pornography issues, it obviously seemed two major political camps in parliament and CSOs which were Islamic group and nationalist group. Islamic group, which has proponents from PKS, PAN, PD, PPP, supported this issue to enact as a new bill in 2008; meanwhile, national group, such as PDIP, opposed by doing some walk-out actions in plenary sessions in the House. On the other hand, The nationalist group gained massive supports from various and across sectoral issues, meanwhile, Islamic groups had full proponents from Islamic mass organizations in different groups. These two groups also have affiliated with different CSOs and run some public debates and campaigns to gain public supports. One of the main issues on this debate is related to pornography definition which is multi-interpretation for being applied in term of different socio-cultural situation. From this point, anti-pornography debates between two groups were seriously deliberated in parliament in 2008 (see Sherlock 2008).

On women’s representation, CSOs group, which was led by Ani Sucipto, promoted gender quota for 30 percent in national legislative candidate nomination in 2004 and 2009 elections. To gain this target, these women CSO’s activists opened some cooperation with women’s groups in political parties to delivering reform message in each party. Although, at the early step was hard to convince male members of the House, these women politicians across political parties and CSOs could endorsed the 30 percent quota in 2004 election and revised the similar rule to strengthen the quota with zipper system (nomination list based on number) in 2009.

From these four cases explanation on making laws which are involving CSOs actors, there are three main points to be considered: the first point is the CSOs activists, who work on advocacy, monitoring and assistancy to parliament, attempted to open their mind to the state and political parties to develop cooperation in order to drive policy changes. At that moment, the government in post-Reformasi also have been cooperated with various groups outside the state. Even military group,
which are well-known as conservative group for receiving social and political changes, was also accepted to have different views on security policy reforms. On the other hand, different issues that are driven by CSOs groups are also difficult for them to being focus on the major one. The second point is political elite response for any changing idea reforms which were introduced by CSOs are not similar. It depended on what was the major policy has been discussed. On one side, based on various issues that explained above, policy reform ideas that were delivered by CSOs did not well institutionalize. Therefore, CSOs groups should intensively communicate and assist reform oriented politicians in order to easily deliver reform idea messages to other resistant politicians. Meanwhile, parliamentary parties also do not have strong and consistent on political stances on any policy discussion in parliament. Consequently, it is difficult to easily understand the mapping of political stance of each party in different issues. The third is because the main challenge of CSOs is not only un-consistency of political stances of parties in parliament but also there is another main issue which is personal relation among political elites and CSOs activists. This personal relation is embedded patronage and clientalism among individuals in our society. To decide a policy, political elite always consider personal supports and informal networks among actors. Usually, this personal relation is connected because of similarity of attachment on some organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah or even alumni from university and other student organizations. Therefore, CSOs activists have to consider personal relations to open a dialogue and communication with politicians in the House.

**ELECTORAL POLITICS OF CSOS**

Meanwhile, electoral politics that are used by CSOs activists could be seen since 2004. Some of CSOs leaders nominated themselves as member of the parliament in national and locals or direct local of head of government elections, for instance, Mietzner (2013) mentions that 37 members of the national House (around 7 percent) in 2009-2014 have political backgrounds as reformist activists. This section will explain some phenomena of CSOs activists who transform themselves from CSOs activists to become politicians in party politics or even just nominate themselves as candidate in election. On this context, there are three main points that will discuss in this section: the first is on what reason
these CSOs activists take this opportunity in electoral politics; second, what their challenges and constraints that faced by these activists to rethink their political strategies to gain that positions; the last thing is structural and institutional changes agenda which are going to promote for gaining that positions. Therefore, in particular, this section discuss some CSOs activists from women’s group who nominated themselves as member of the national House in 2004 and 2009 elections (Perdana 2014) and similar experiences from different CSOs groups which was discussed by Ichwanuddin (2010).

These women CSOs activists who participated in national and local elections from 2004 to 2014 have strong motivation to their struggles to endorse 30 percent quota in parliament. This is the basic argument that most of women activists took this political opportunity. Since 2004, these women leaders in civil society groups and political parties have collaborated to gain 30 percent quota in parliament. Working cooperation between women CSOs and women organizations in political parties could be occurred because political parties’ elites felt difficulties for finding competent women candidates.

The success of delivering gender quota in parliament is not equal to the capability of political parties for nominating candidates who have big opportunity to gain the seat. Perdana (2014) observes seven women NGOs activists who have technocratic capability in social development nominated as candidates in elections. Unfortunately, most of them were failed to be elected. These seven candidates were requested by political parties’ elites to nominate as candidates in legislative elections. The party elites also decided their post constituent areas. One of the weaknesses of these non-elected candidates is their personal candidate team that unable to mobilize political supports in constituent areas and also lack of financial supports candidates. Meanwhile, the elected women were successful candidates to maximize voter supports and also received some financial supports even though most of these women received political assistancy and supports from different and particular women’s groups. Unfortunately, this direct election system and strong money politics indication become major constrains for these activists to gain their goals in their constituent areas.

These days, some of non-elected candidates are still doing their activities in two different arenas (civil society and political party) by parallel ways. They have developed cooperation arena in partial which easily make a dialogue between CSOs and political parties. The partiality is
caused by non-formal supports indication from a NGO, as an example, to particular party. Therefore, this communication access is developed in term of informal and personal relations which are exist in two different arenas. Meanwhile, elected candidates should have to maintain their communication between political parties and NGOs for particular gender issues. Similar with previous one, this cooperation arena could be developed because of informal and personal relations.

On similar tone with women group stories, the LIPI study about transformation NGOs activists to electoral competition (Ichwanuddin 2010) also seeks on motivation aspect to use political opportunity, challenges and constraints and also political agenda that want to be delivered. LIPI researchers observed local and national legislative election candidates. One major thing from candidates’ descriptions is a similar problem that is faced by women candidates which are lack of constituent and financial supports. Their motivation to participate in this election is to drive changes from inside parliament and political party as new opportunity in electoral politics after Reformasi. Afterward, the activists who transformed their new identity to political arena have personal motivation to participate in election rather than institutional demands. In this context, a tied between CSOs leaders and their supporting organizations such as coalition, alliance, community organizations are getting weak to have political electoral agreement. In similar ways with women activists, these non-elected candidates preferred to have political activities in two sides (political parties and NGOs) to endorse changes.

In general, according to CSOs activists’ experiences who participated as candidates in 2004 and 2009, there are four points that should be noticed: the first one is the openness of political opportunity. This could be seen from enactment of new rules on election with closed list proportional representation in 2004 to become open list proportional representation in 2009. On this new election system, voters could elect candidate based on open list with numbers in a constituent area. Therefore, direct election for head of local government could also have a chance for CSOs activists to nominate themselves through political parties or independent candidate (without any support from political parties). In this context, political parties require capable candidates who can raise party’s image and its performance in parliament as well as candidates’ popularity to raising party votes in their constituent areas. These CSOs activists have openness ideas and also can drive social changes rather that political parties cadres. At that moment, the enact-
ment of 30 percent quotas in parliament was triggered for women CSOs groups and political parties for taking the opportunity.

Second, personal CSOs activists’ reflection shows that they think their struggle to drive policies from outside the government was ineffective. This is caused by the lack of internal government monitoring in order to implement some policies. The CSOs activists positively respond when there are wide and open political opportunities. This personal reflection on their disappoinment on making changes from outside the government is also social movement evaluation on advocating structural changes. This motivation exactly joins between political parties need to have capable candidates and personal willingness from CSOs activists for significant changes from inside of parliament or government. Thus, party leaders invited these CSOs activists to involve in as candidate and to give them support on candidacies. Unfortunately, party supports and political parties’ leaders did not guarantee on candidates’ electability in the election. In consequent, they need serious and systematic voters mobilization to gain electoral votes because the personal motivation without systematic and solid supports would become useless in the winning parliament seats.

The third reason is the weakness of CSOs activists on electoral politics which lack of supporting voters group. They also do not have organizational party supports in lower level on their nomination in constituent areas and numbers in the party list. Therefore, there is no bargaining power between parties and candidates’ supporting organizations. These CSOs activists were easily shifted their priority number on the list and their constituent areas by selection candidates’ team. If there is personal and informal supports from politic parties’ elites to these activists, that is normative and easily manipulate to other members. On pilkada (regional election), because of CSOs candidates do not adequate financial supports on campaign preparation, politic parties reluctant support that candidacies. These CSOs activists who have weak financial and electoral supports could not able to gain maximum voters because the implementation of proportional representation electoral system with open list, which the winners is decided by majority votes. On this context, major CSOs activists who failed on their winning in election are caused by no mandate organizations supports, weak constituent supports, and also weak of party structure supports.

Lastly, social changes agenda which are addressed by CSOs actors from inside and outside the government and parliament has indirectly
opened a communication access between CSOs and government. Unfortunately, because of the CSOs are fragmented based on sectoral issues, tightening and access between CSOs and the state is personal and informal. Although the strength of CSOs actors is social development technocratic that could be used by politicians and governments. However, because of the lack of relations among CSOs actors, especially from NGOs, and their communities, it makes the relationship could not be developed well. Additionally, according to Aspinall (2013a), the fragmentation of NGOs was caused by the motivation of making NGOs for new development programs. This is a fact that it strengthens personal relations and patronages in Indonesian civil society rather than formal institutional relations.

**CONCLUSION**

Four cases on law-making process in the House and electoral politics that involve CSOs activists have explained another four points related to political opportunities that had used by CSOs after Reformasi: first point is the Habibie’s government applied the political openness as the central point on Indonesian democratization. This central point explains that various CSOs groups and other groups outside the government could make cooperation and positively communicate with government or even with the House to endorse political changes. CSOs’ willingness and motivation for using this openness of political opportunities can be traced with their formal political activities. In particular, a good response of political institutional structures also easily endorses various groups to actively participate in formal political fields.

The major challenges that are faced by CSOs for using this political opportunity is there is no general agreement in order to view electoral politics as major political strategies in their formal politics. Since Reformasi 1998 fragmented CSOs have been not jointed new general agreement on seeking what is ways the civil society could be achieved, what and why some new regulations should be reformed, including the full participation in electoral politics. Organizationally these CSOs activists have some independent chance to decide his/her political decision to participate as election candidates, but usually that is not a mandate of organizations. A few of organizations stated their supports to their members to participate in the election who have been done by LBH APIK. Two large of socio-religion organizations such as NU and
Muhammadiyah also do similar ways to allow full and independent political position and political affiliation for each of their members. Therefore, to face electoral politics, some of these actors believe that it is an important strategy to involve in the government; however some of them are being stay outside of the government.

The second is a complex of political stability of elite’s dimension. According to some political interaction between CSOs and parties in parliament, it shows that supporting for one major issue in parliament from CSOs did not come from the consistency of party’s views on that problem. However, party can easily changes their views on one issue. PDI-P as secular party, opposed any issues that are addressed by Islamic party group on the anti-pornography law, meanwhile this Islamic parties such as PPP and PKS did not have rejection on gender quota in parliament. However, on particular issues such as the winning electoral interests, these parliamentary parties had separated into two main groups which were large supporters party and small-medium supporters party. It also means that support and political stance of elite politics and their parties are based on particular issues and not consistently referred to organizational views. This is also occurred on electoral politics issue. Parties do not have any solid mechanism to recruit CSOs actors in any candidate election nomination in legislative and Pilkada elections. Candidate nomination in each constituent area and the number of their list is the authority of elite parties. Therefore, elite party seems to have negotiation with valuable candidates who can give electoral benefits to the party. These CSOs actors do not have high calls on that negotiation.

The third is alliance and engagement political elites could be happened while there are formal and informal communications between political elites in party and CSOs activists. This alliance is temporary, but also flexible and depends on the messages that are addressed by CSOs. On this context, CSOs understand that the importance of learning supporting political map on issues is the main strategy that should be considered by each organization. On the other hand, to endorse and to monitor policies in parliament of government, CSOs also have advocacy strategies, political lobby, and also effective campaigns. In particular, NGOs have been used to develop an issue to deliver as draft in law-making process in parliament. Furthermore, members of the House also have understood all of these strategies when there is an interaction between NGOs and the House.
Meanwhile, these CSOs activists, who competed in electoral politics, should proved their mobilization voters capability to elite party to show that the party supports is based on an agreement for gaining votes in election. This point shows the weakness of CSOs and could not able to show their strength on electoral supports. Therefore, some of them prefer to mobilize informal supports such as personal and individual relations and organizational connection to show his electoral supports in the constituent area.

This study concludes that various CSOs activities on formal politics arena are caused by different political opportunities dimension after the New Order felled in 1998. Unfortunately, some wide and open opportunities are using; this is not fully supported by cultural politics structures changes that still inherit patronage relations among political actors. Therefore, Indonesian CSOs have faced un-solidity on their movements to endorse reform agenda in law-making process and also lack of electoral political supports for gaining votes to any CSOs activists candidates in elections. Findings on law-making process shows that although CSOs address some progressive ideas on particular issues which is discussed above, the House does not have a clear political stance to accept or to oppose some that reform ideas. The making laws discussion is depending on how is the flow of that issue in public arena without any clear political stances among parliamentary parties. Meanwhile, findings on electoral politics shows that there is a huge enthusiasm among CSOs activists on their involvement on election nomination even though their lack of ability to gain maximum votes in legislative election is caused by their weakness to mobilize political supports. Structural changes are not only the strong of patrimonial and patronage relations, but also local oligarch political power could able to hamper CSOs activists ability to fairly mobilize voters without the power of money politics.

This study just only explains some general phenomena on the politics of CSOs after Reformasi 1998. However, this study suggests following up some updated political phenomena of CSOs based on particular supports to presidential candidates in 2014. It means that the future study is important to seek any updated information on how CSOs actors use their openness political opportunities.
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